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Background: The Minimal Group paradigm proposed that social categorisation alone was 
necessary to produce group behaviour. Moreover, through Social Identity Theory the studies 
claimed that once people are categorised into groups they automatically take on group 
personas that cause them to favour their ingroups and discriminate against the outgroup. 
Other scholars contend that groups are not as simple as sharing a social category. They are 
instead more complex social systems of interacting individuals which consist of dynamics 
and networks as people engage in social activity and make meaning of their behaviours. 
Moreover, groups are typically defined by patterns and norms which emerge through 
interaction and evolve over time. Thus, by having removed interaction from their 
methodology, scholars believe that the minimal group studies became too minimal that they 
omitted an essential component involved in groups. There is a need therefore to re-visit these 
studies in an environment that captures the interactive nature of groups and illuminates the 
diachronic processes involved in group formation and behaviour.  
Aim and Rationale: This research replicated the MG studies in an interactive setting to study 
the influence of status on the token giving behaviours of minimal groups.  
Methodology: The research adopted a quantitative descriptive method. A convenience 
sampling strategy was used to select participants from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus. An experiment in the format of a computer game was conducted 
where participants after being categorised into one of two groups, were tasked with allocating 
tokens to other members of groups over a 40 game round period. The Virtual Interaction 
APPLication software provided a platform for studying how groups take shape as they 
interact, receive feedback, and make meaning of their behaviours over time. To measure 
ingroup favouritism the study measured instances of outgroup giving among the players. 
Outgroup giving mirrored ingroup giving without self-giving and was therefore deemed as a 
more reliable measure of ingroup favouritism. All data from the games was saved onto the 
programme and analysed using the Generalised Linear Mixed Model method.  
Results: Findings displayed that players in the group condition were less likely than those in 
the individual condition to engage in outgroup giving. This meant group categorisation 
produced group orientated behaviours among participants. Outgroup giving was found to be 
numerically higher among groups in the social equality condition than those in the social 
inequality condition, and increased over the rounds. An interaction between status and social 




groups conditions was highest in the social inequality condition. High status groups displayed 
significantly higher levels of outgroup giving than low status groups, with this norm 
increasing over the game rounds. Low status groups displayed the lowest levels of outgroup 
giving overall.  
Conclusion: This study investigated the effects of status on the token giving patterns of 
minimal groups in an interactive environment. The study determined that ingroup favouritism 
and outgroup antagonism was highest in conditions of social inequality. Unequal status 
groups were more likely to favour their own groups in their token allocations than equal 
status groups. Low status groups were least likely overall to share their tokens with the 
outgroup and as a result were more discriminatory than high status groups. The study also 
introduced a new framework for studying groups rather as dynamic and interacting 
phenomena as opposed to mere social categories. Using this approach, the study 
demonstrated that group behaviours are indeed marked by sequential patterns of interaction 
and change processes that increase and gain momentum over time and give rise to normative 
behaviours. Thus, interaction serves as the primary conduit of social influence between 
groups as individuals actively relate to one another and make meaning of their behaviours.   
Key words: Minimal Group Paradigm, Group, Group dynamics, Intergroup Relations, 
Ingroup favouritism, Social Identity Theory, Status, Low status groups, High Status groups, 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The Minimal Group studies became the first model to lay the foundation for the 
categorisation analysis of intergroup relations (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). The studies 
were concerned with the minimal conditions required to generate group behaviour. To 
explore this experimental conditions representing ingroup-outgroup relations were set up and 
participants were led to believe that they had been categorised into one of two groups based 
on their preference for one of two provided paintings (Tajfel, Billing, Bundy & Flament, 
1971). Group categorisation had in fact been random. Participants took part in a resource 
allocation task where they were to distribute resources between other participants (Tajfel, et 
al., 1971). Participants however were only identified by their group membership. 
Findings of the study established that participants allocated more resources to members of 
their own groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; McGarty, 1999; Tajfel, et al., 1971;; Wilder, 1986). 
This strategy was coined ingroup favouritism; the act of favouring members of one‟s own 
group over members of the outgroup. The study as a result concluded that a group, “in its 
purest form is nothing more than an arbitrary label” (Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2011, p.2) 
and that the simple act of categorising people is sufficient enough to give rise to a group. This 
triggers competitive and discriminatory responses among members of groups to the extent 
that members favour their ingroups even at the expense of the outgroup (Brown & Gaertner, 
2001). 
The Social Identity Theory (SIT) was then developed by the researchers to expand upon and 
account for the psychological effects of social categorisation on groups (Condor, 1990; 
Hornsey 2008). A social identity was defined as an individual‟s self-concept of who they are 
based on group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to the theory, once people 
are categorised into groups they immediately take on group personas and because positive 
social identities contribute to intrinsic feelings of self-worth, people are more likely to favour 
their own groups than the outgroup as they seek to establish a positive shared identity (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; Hornsey, 2008;).  
Research has investigated the effects of status on groups and has found its ability to moderate 
social identity (Commins & Lockwood, 1979; Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg, 1993; 




of comparison” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.43). In these studies status often determined 
whether members would favour their ingroups or the outgroup. For these reasons some 
scholars agree that groups in the MG studies particularly favoured their ingroups not due to 
the categorisation effect, but because they wanted to boost the status of their groups (Hertel & 
Kerr, 2001).  
In further demonstrating the role of status on groups, many studies have explored and 
compared the behaviours of groups in environments of social equality and inequality (Fedrico 
& Levin, 2004; Mullen, Brown & Smith, 1992; Rabinowitz, 1999). Findings of the studies 
have revealed that in environments of social equality, ingroup favouritism is reduced and 
groups tend to share their resources with one another and pursue fairness and co-operation 
(Allport, 1954; Branthwaite, Doyle & Lightbown, 1979; Gaertner, Dovido, Anastasio, 
Backman & Rust, 1993; Harding & Hogrete, 1952;; Hertel & Kerr, 2001). Groups that are 
unequal in status however are more typically marked by ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
antagonism, as these environments prompt social competition between groups (Rapoport; 
1988; Smith, Jackson & Sparks, 2003; Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001).  
Additional research has specifically explored the behaviours of socially unequal groups 
(Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton & Hume, 2001; Commins and Lockwood, 1979; Ellemers, 1993; 
Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1987, 1991). Some studies have suggested that because „high 
status‟ is often associated with power and superiority, members of high status groups are  
motivated to protect their status and thus display high levels of ingroup favouritism 
(Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg, 1993; Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). On the other 
hand, other research has suggested that because low status often affects one‟s self concept 
negatively, members of low status groups will strongly favour their ingroups in an attempt to 
elevate their status (Brown, 1995; Commins,& Lockwood,1979; Rubin, Badea, & Jetten, 
2014). This strategy by low status groups is said to represent a broader strategy of social 
competition, as low status groups enter into „battle‟ with high status groups to challenge the 
status quo (Taubervan & Leeuwen, 2012; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990).  
While it is undeniable that the MG studies were a pioneer in group research, they have 
however received criticism (Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 1980, Bornstein, Crum, 
Wittenbraker, Harring, Insko & Thibaut, 1983a; Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titlestad & 
Tooke, 2016; Rabbie, Schot & Visser, 1989, Rubin & Hewstone, 1998;). A primary concern 




Bordia, DiFonzo & Chang, 1999). The studies concluded that a group is merely a label, and 
that it is formed once people are assigned to those labels. Other scholars however contend 
that groups are more complex. These scholars suggest that a group is rather a social system of 
interacting individuals who take on the role of social actors as they interact and make 
meaning of their behaviours (Bordia et al., 1999; Goffman, 1959, 1963). Groups are typically 
marked by dynamics and feedback processes which yield patterns, networks, roles and even 
status (Veenstra & Steglich, 2011). These social processes carry meaningful information 
about the social action of groups, which then evolves and takes shape over time and in turn 
affects the group and its members (Goffman, 1959; 1963). Therefore, it has been argued that 
in omitting social interaction from its design, the MG studies became too minimal and lost 
the essence of a group and the complexities behind its formation and continuation (Durrheim 
et al., 2016).  
The present research as a result aimed to replicate the MG studies in an interactive setting 
using a lab-based experimental software named VIAPPL.. . Moreover, since groups in the 
MG studies were implicitly of equal status and yielded no information regarding the 
influence of status on the behaviours of the groups, the study sought to incorporate this aspect 








Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
The striving of human beings for status has been explored in various fields of study with 
extensive theoretical arguments and evidence suggesting that individuals perceive status as a 
sign of competence and pursue it as a means to achieve power and resources (Huberman, 
Loch, & Onculer, 2004). The influence of status extends to groups. Groups are a medium of 
social life and indeed one of the most profound means of interaction between human beings. 
Research exploring the influence of status on real life groups suggests that groups higher in 
the social order tend to have more access to scarce resources, receive better social support, 
enjoy better physical health and have a longer life span (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). As a 
result, all kinds of groups in society are typically motivated to work towards increasing the 
status of their groups because the implications of achieving high status for one‟s group are so 
profound (Hogan, 1983).  
 
Whilst there is a variety of research on the influence of status on broader and real life groups, 
there is much about its influence particularly on minimal groups that has not been 
investigated. Whether status still plays such a substantial role even within minimal group 
environments is an area that requires further investigation.   
 
1. The Minimal Group studies 
 
The earliest form of research on social groups, and the first to lay the foundation for the study 
for intergroup relations were the Minimal Group (MG) studies. The studies conducted by 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament (1971) introduced the methods now known as the Minimal 
Group Paradigm‟ (MGP). Previous research on groups claimed that a group is typically 
formed when people are attracted to one another because they have shared goals and common 
identities (Sherif, 1936). The MG studies however proposed otherwise, attributing group 
formation to even more basic processes. To prove this claim, the scholars created studies to 
test the most minimal conditions required for the development of group behavior. 
The studies were experiments that involved school boys participating in what they thought 
was a study of decision making (Hogg & Vaughn, 2005). They were assigned to one of two 
groups on a completely random basis but believed that they had been assigned to a group 
based on expressed preference for paintings by either Kandinsky or Klee (Hogg & Vaughn, 




or Klee group), with the identity of their fellow ingroup and outgroup members hidden by the 
use of code numbers (Tajfel et al., 1971). After proceeding to an isolated cubicle, the 
participants were handed an allocation booklet and asked to allocate rewards between pairs of 
recipients identified solely by code number and group membership (Hogg & Vaughn, 2005). 
“This paper-and-pencil task was repeated for a number of different pairs of in-group and out-
group members, excluding self, on a series of distribution matrices carefully designed to tease 
out the sorts of strategies that were being used” (Hogg & Vaughan, 2005, p.376).   
1.1. The Tajfel Matrices 
 
The MG study matrices were the dependent instruments of the MGP intended to measure 
how groups allocate resources to one another. The matrices would assess the relative strength 
of the participant allocation strategies during the games (Bourhis, Sachdev, Gagnon, 1994). 
Each matrix entailed two rows of thirteen numberseach representing a value. The values on 
the top or bottom row were to be allocated to the ingroup or outgroup depending on the 
participant‟s choice of allocation. This allocation choice could either be between an ingroup 
or outgroup member, two ingroup members, or two outgroup members. The matrices were 
designed in such a way that six basic reward-allocation strategies could be distinguished. 
These strategies were highlighted by Bourhis et al. (1994) as follows; 
1. Fairness also known as parity (P), referred to the numerically equal allocation of 
rewards to both ingroup and outgroup members. 
2. Maximum joint profit (MJP) concerned an allocation strategy that sought to 
maximize the total joint number of rewards to both the ingroup and outgroup. 
3. Maximum ingroup profit (MIP) involved allocating the greatest rewards to the 
ingroup members. 
4. Maximum differentiation (MD) was a discriminatory strategy which sought to 
maximize the difference of reward allocations between the ingroup and outgroup at the 
expense of the outgroup, even if the ingroup received less than the possible maximum as a 
result. 
5. Ingroup favouritism (FAV) referred to an allocation strategy which favoured the 




6. Outgroup favouritism (OF) referred to the favouring of the outgroup by allocating 
greater rewards to its members. 
Ultimately, three matrices were designed as instruments and used to measure the following 
allocation strategies (Bourhis et al, 1994); 
1. Matrix Type A provided a comparison of ingroup favouristism (FAV= MIP+ MD) to 
maximum joint profit (MJP) 
2. Matrix Type B provided a comparison of maximum difference in favour of the ingroup 
(MD) to the combination of maximum ingroup profit (MIP) and maximum joint 
profit (MJP) 
3. Matrix Type C provided a comparison between fairness (P) to ingroup favouritism 
(FAV).  
 
Figure 1: Tajfel et al. (1971) matrices demonstrating allocation strategies to 








These instruments essentially provided the allocation options of fairness, ingroup favouritism 
and outgroup discrimination. On the matrices as illustrated in Figure 1 (adapted from Table 6 
in Experiment 2), in Type A matrix for example, when a participant allocated rewards to a 
member of their ingroup the allocation strategies of maximum joint profit, maximum ingroup 
profit and maximum difference in favour of the ingroup were positioned on the extreme left 
of the matrix (Tajfel, et al., 1971). Contrarily in the Type B matrix, when the participant 
allocated rewards to a member of their outgroup these were positioned on the extreme right 





1.2. Ingroup favouritism  
 
The results of the experiments determined that participants tended to significantly allocate 
more rewards to members of their own groups. That is, groups were more likely to favour 
members belonging to their own groups (FAV) in their allocations than those of the outgroup 
(Tajfel et al., 1971). The studies consequently coined this phenomenon “ingroup 
favouritism”, which referred to the preference and affinity for members of one‟s group over 
those of the outgroup (Turner, 1987).  
From these findings the MG studies concluded that whilst categorisation generally serves as a 
structure for individual understanding of the social environment, it also draws the line 
between “us and them”, producing an orientation for self-reference where individuals begin 
to define themselves and their positions according to the groups they have been assigned to  
(Brown & Gaertner, 2001; Brown, Tajfel & Turner, 1980;). Subsequently, the studies 
concluded that the simple act of categorisation alone was necessary to produce a group. 
Furthermore, the studies highlighted that categorisation “propels the individual down the road 
to bias” (Wilder, 1986 in Brown & Gaertner, 2001, p.13), meaning that assignment to groups 
automatically triggers discrimination in favour of the ingroup, even at the expense of the 
outgroup (Allen & Wilder, 1975).  
2. Social Identity Theory: why do members favour the ingroup?  
 
Researchers of the MG studies later developed the Social Identity Theory (SIT) to expand 
upon and offer psychological explanations of the MG findings. According to SIT, once 
having been categorised into groups people immediately begin define themselves in terms of 
their group membership (Condor 1990, Hornsey, 2008; Turner, 1975; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
This group persona was referred to as social identity. This was an individual‟s knowledge of 
their belonging to a social group as well as their self-concept of who they are based on group 
membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975;). In addition, social identities were 
described as relational and comparative, often “defining the individual as similar or different 
from, as better as or worse than, members of other groups” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.40). 
 
SIT proposed that people are generally motivated to attain positive social identities as these 
increase sense of self-worth (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As a result, people are more likely to 
favour their own groups because they seek to establish positive social identities. When a 




themselves more positively (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Additionally, groups are also capable 
of preserving positive social identities by ensuring that the group continues to compare 
distinctively and favourably from other groups (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). Since a 
positive evaluation is preserved when ingroup-outgroup comparisons favour the ingroup, 
members of groups will be more inclined to strongly favour their ingroups whilst viewing the 
outgroup negatively (Harvey & Bourhis, 2013).  
3. The influence of status on groups 
 
Research investigating the influence of status on groups has found that it tends to act as a 
moderator of social identity. Status is an indicator of a group‟s “relative position on some 
evaluative dimension of comparison” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.43) and consequently people 
will generally aspire to belong to groups that are of a higher status as this enhances social 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Hertel and Kerr (2001) contend that status serves as a vital 
incentive and motivating force of social behavior between groups and consequently 
suggested that groups in the MG favoured their own groups not only due to the categorisation 
effect, but because they sought to boost the status of their groups. Similarly, Rabbie, Schot 
and Visser (1989) argue that ingroup favouritism in the MG studies reflected participants‟ 
desires to acquire as many rewards as opposed to trying to enhance self-esteem.  
3.1. Groups in contexts of social equality and inequality  
 
Group status is characteristically determined by the presiding social organisation in which 
groups are present. This is referred to as the social structure. The social structure serves as a 
guide for behaviour in that it constructs the context in which groups interact (Ellemers, 1993; 
Scheepers, Spears, Doosje & Manstead, 2006). The relationship between the social structure 
and status of groups has been investigated in numerous studies. The studies have determined 
that groups often demonstrate different behaviours in environments of social equality and 
inequality. (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton & Hume, 2001; Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, Wilke & 
van Knippenberg, 1993;).  
An equal status environment is one where groups compare the same in terms of relative status 
(Commins & Lockwood, 1979). This environment is devoid of status differences between 
groups and groups are generally able to obtain the status positions that they deserve without 




Studies have found that in contexts of equal resources between groups, social discrepancies 
between groups are less likely to arise (Allport, 1954; Branthwaite, Doyle & Lightbrown, 
1979; Gaertner, Dovido, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993; Harding & Hogrete, 1952;). 
Adopting Hewstone & Brown‟s (1986) Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model, Gaetner et 
al., (1993) tested whether interaction between equal status groups would be effective in 
reducing intergroup bias and whether attitudes towards the outgroup would be more 
favourable. The study‟s findings did in fact determine that when groups were of equal status, 
discrimination against the outgroup was reduced (Gaetner et al., 1993). Another study by 
Eek, Biel & Garling (2001) tested the effects of equality on the cooperative responses of 
groups in contexts of social dilemma. The study found that when groups were of equal status 
both groups tended to pursue fairness and cooperation. Additionally, in these contexts social 
cohesion between the groups has been found to be strengthened. Studies investigating inter-
ethnic relations in such environments have consistently demonstrated that equality between 
groups reduces prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998).  
Unequal status environments on the other hand are marked by social hierarchies and status 
differentials between groups (Ellemers, 1993). Research has shown that unequal contexts 
typically cultivate opposing motives between groups (Smith, Jackson, Sparks, 2003; 
Rapoport, 1988). Hewstone and Brown‟s (1978) study demonstrated that when a group 
perceives itself as higher in status compared to other groups, its members are more likely to 
display behaviours that favour the ingroup (Eek, Biel and Garling, 2001). Other research 
holds that when society is stratified and when status imbalances between groups are salient, 
relations between the groups will be characterised by high levels of ingroup favouritism and 
outgroup antagonism (Smith, Jackson & Sparks, 2003). Furthermore, studies conducted on 
ethnic and religious groups have consistently revealed that when there are clear status 
differences between such groups, intergroup discrimination is accentuated and often produces 
large-scale violent conflicts (Smith, Jackson, Sparks & 2003; Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001). 
3.1.1. Low and High status groups: who discriminates more? 
 
Various studies has further investigated the effects of status asymmetries in low and high 
groups (Commins & Lockwood, 1979; Bettencourt et al., 2001; Ellemers, et al., 1993; 
Mullen, Brown & Smith., 1992; Fedrico & Levin, 2004; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1987, 
1991;,;). High status is typically associated with prestige and power (Taubervan & van 




held in higher regards (Barkow, 1975; Ellemers, et al., 1993). Consequently, membership in a 
high status group is generally perceived as more attractive than belonging to a group of a 
lower status. Social Identity Theory claims that membership in a high status group inevitably 
results in a positive social identity (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). According to the 
theory, due to the positive contribution that high status rewards to one‟s self concept, 
members of relatively higher status groups are likely to find it easier to demonstrate bias in 
favour of their ingroups (Hewstone et al., 2002). Favouring their own groups also represents 
a strategy by high status members to protect and maintain their status (Ellemers, 1993). 
Mullen et al., (1992) conducted a series of minimal group experiments that investigated the 
effect of status on the point allocation strategies of low and high status groups. These studies 
determined that high status groups were more likely to favour their own groups whereas low 
status groups often favoured the high status outgroup (Sachdev & Bourhis 1985, 1991). 
These findings have led some scholars to believe that high status groups are more 
discriminatory than low status groups (Fedrico & Levin, 2004). 
Low status on the other hand is generally deemed as less favourable and membership in a low 
status group is said to affect one‟s self-concept negatively (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). 
Some scholars argue that members of low status groups will be less likely to favour their 
ingroup and would instead display favouritism to the high status outgroup (Ellemers, 1993). 
Various studies found that members of low status groups did in fact display favouritism 
towards the high status outgroup (Jost & Hunyady,2002; Jost and Burgress,2000  and Jost, 
Pelham & Carvallo, 2002). . The studies concluded that this was due to their internalized a 
sense of inferiority. Other scholars however argue otherwise and suggest that the impact of 
„low status‟ on deprived groups will most likely produce less adequate social identity on its 
members giving rise to „threat‟ on their social identities as they assume subordinate positions 
(Brown, 1995; Commins & Lockwood, 1978; Rubin, Badea, & Jetten, 2014). Consequently, 
members of low status groups will be more motivated to attain more positive social identities 
and as a result will display higher levels of discrimination against the high status outgroup 
(Ellemers et al., 2003). By strongly favouring their own groups, low status members are able 
to use this method as an instrumental means of reversing the status quo through elevating 






4. Ingroup favouritism as social competition  
 
Since groups are generally not fond of occupying the bottom of the social hierarchy and few 
are unwilling to share the top position, conflicts between low and high status groups may be a 
challenge to resolve (Maiese, 2004). Scholars suggest that ingroup favouritism by low and 
high status groups also represents a broader strategy of social competition (Scheepers, Spears, 
Doosje & Manstead, 2006). Social competition is a form of „identity conflict‟ typically 
comprised of issues around the distribution of resources and battles for status and privilege 
(Maiese, 2004). As groups generally have an instinct for self-preservation they may be 
persuaded to fight for a spot in social relations. Thus, when entering into social competition 
with one another low and high status groups may display explicit expressions of ingroup 
favouritism (Scheepers, et al., 2006).   
Research has confirmed the presence of social competition between low and high status 
groups in contexts of social inequality. Various studies found evidence for low status groups 
displaying high levels of ingroup favouritism and confirmed these as serving as both joint 
action and enhancement strategies to enter into direct competition with high status groups in 
order to challenge the existing social order (Bettencourt et al., 2001; ; Ellemers & van 
Knippenberg, 1997; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam., 1990;). However, other studies also 
yielded the same behaviours in high status groups (Ellemers, 1992, Mullen et al., 19992). 
Mullen et al., (1992) particularly determined that in certain contexts, high status groups also 
significantly favoured their ingroups. These studies interpreted these behaviours as having 
stemmed from the possibility of the status hierarchy being rearranged, which was said to have 
placed demands on members of high status groups where the prospect of change posed as a 
threat to the group‟s advantaged position and symbolized the risk of losing their status 
(Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005; Taubervan & Leeuwen, 2012). 
It is evident that conditions of social inequality can incite social competition aimed at either 
the attainment of status by low status groups or maintenance of status by high status groups 
(Ellemers et al., 1993). These conflicting motives lead groups to want to dominate other 
groups and compete with them for a higher status position (Maiese, 2004). Consequently,  
“both parties [may] feel threatened and sense a need to retaliate in order to defend 
themselves. As the struggle continues, the conflict tends to escalate, and may even 




with everyone else (thus eliminating many of the benefits of being on the top), the 
conflict will most likely continue. Moreover, even if… [low status groups] are able to 
reverse the situation and become the leadership group; a new conflict is likely to arise 
as… [the high status group now at] the bottom begin[s] their attempt to… climb 
[back] to the top.” (Maiese, 2004, p. 1) 
5. Who is deserving of occupying the top? 
 
In many situations “groups believe that they deserve a higher status in virtue of their 
supposed moral superiority” (Maiese, 2004, pp 1). Those situated in the lower rank of the 
social hierarchy may believe their social status to be a form of injustice that requires fighting 
to overcome (Maiese, 2004). Studies have tested the conditions under which groups might 
socially compete and where status relations can be overturned. Findings have determined that 
when status relations between low and high status groups are perceived as deserved, low 
status groups show more favouritism towards the high status outgroups (Sachdev & Bourhis, 
1987; Bettencourt et al., 2001). In these contexts groups are often perceived as incomparable, 
meaning that intergroup discrimination will be reduced (Ellemers, 1993). It is reasoned that 
when groups believe that status relations are deserved, low status groups will acknowledge 
their inferiority to high status groups and refrain from group attempts at establishing more 
positive social identities or claiming superiority (Mullen et al., 1992). 
On the other hand when status relations are perceived as undeserved, low status groups seek 
to improve the status of their groups as a whole (Bettencourt et al., 2001; Ellemers, 1993; 
Ellemers, et al., 1993; Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & 
Brown, 1987;). Intergroup comparisons in these conditions generally will arise and serve as 
basis for frustration among low status groups and a threat for high status groups, and as a 
result inciting social competition (Ellemers et al., 1993).  
6. Methodological critique of the Minimal Group studies 
 
The MG studies (1971) provide a useful and practical framework for studying the behaviours 
of groups in experimentally controlled conditions. As demonstrated by Mullen et al. (1992), 
they even offer the prospect of studying the influence of status in very basic settings of 
minimal groups. Whilst the studies have been a forerunner in group research the methodology 
has not gone without its fair share of criticisms. Over the years arguments have been raised 




that the study omitted social interaction as an essential component of group formation.. , In 
addition the study used an extreme scoring design which is said to have produced demand 
characteristics and possible errors in the interpretation of findings (Aschenbrenner & 
Schaefer, 1980, Veenstra & Steglich, 2011).  
6.1. Groups are systems of interacting individuals rather than labels   
 
In seeking the most basic conditions for the formation of group behavior the MG studies 
omitted social interaction from their design. The studies then concluded that social 
categorisation alone was necessary to produce a group – demonstrated by the significant 
finding of ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination (Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 
1980). Some scholars however argue that groups are far more complex than people simply 
sharing a label. This line of thought asserts that groups are instead social systems of 
interacting individuals typically characterised by multiple and dynamic processes which give 
rise to its existence (Bordia, DiFonzo & Chang, 1999; Hackman, 1990; Karp, Jin. Yamagishi 
& Shinotsuka, 1993;).  
 
Without interaction individuals in the MG studies were passive beings taking part in an 
activity (Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titlestad & Tooke, 2016). In a group however, 
individuals are rather „actors‟ engaging in social activity as they perform with and towards 
one another and receive responses in return (Goffman (1959) in Abrams & Hogg, 1988). This 
means that groups take shape through social interactions as individuals seek to make meaning 
of their behaviours and participate in constructing their own realities (Goffman, 1959; Sutton 
& Douglas, 1993). This is viewed as a performance which itself is influenced by the context 
in which the groups exist as well as the members observing the interaction (Goffman, 1959). 
6.1.1. The role of interaction on social identity  
 
Social identity is generated collaboratively as groups interact and perform specific tasks 
(Goffman, 1963). Therefore social interaction in these contexts facilitates social identity as 
groups act in relation to one another and negotiate their behaviours (Goffman, 1963). The 
process for establishing social identity “becomes closely allied to the concept of the 
“persona” [which is described as] that part of the individual‟s performance which regularly 
functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who [act] and 




6.1.2. Group norms 
 
As interactions and social activity take place between members of groups information is 
exchanged. Often this information contains ideals, traditions and socially accepted 
conventions (Doyal & Harris, 1986). Jetten, Spears and Manstead (1996) define these as the 
ideological content of group norms.  
 
Norms have been a key feature in group research over the years. Early studies by Asch 
(1951) described social norms as „mutual conformity‟; where group members come to be 
influenced by each other‟s opinions simply because there is no initial clear standard to begin 
with. Similarly, Homans (1950 in Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) defined norms as  “an idea in the 
minds of the members of a group… that can be put in the form of a statement specifying what 
the members or other [people] should do, ought to do, are expected to do, under given 
circumstances…” [p. 129]. Sherif‟s (1936) „autokinetic effect‟ study revealed that 
participants‟ behaviours were strongly influenced and changed by the actions of others.  
 
In order for norms to exert social influence they must however be communicated between 
people (Rimal & Real, 2005). Social interaction plays a crucial role in facilitating the process 
of the communication and establishment of norms among groups. These communications are 
carried through social networks or ties and serve to diffuse information and norms between 
groups as they negotiate guidelines for group members on how to perform (Arrow, Poole, 
Henry, Wheelan & Moreland, 2004; Bordia, et al., 1999;). Therefore interaction as a process 
of group formation forms the very basis of norm adoption which in turn serves as a conduit of 
influence (Rimal & Real, 2005).  
 
6.1.3. Temporal and evolving nature of group interaction 
 
The MG studies failed to recognise and capture the role of social networks and ties as unit 
forming processes of groups. Not only was this due to the fact that social interaction was 
removed from the design, but it was also due to the study observation of group behavior as a 
once off event rather dynamic and sequential process (Sutton & Douglas, 2013; Durrheim et 
al., 2016).  
It has been suggested that groups evolve and take shape over a series of events and periods 




as the temporal perspective of groups, which interprets groups as systems in which change 
transpires over time scales (Arrow et al., 2004). In this approach groups are marked by social 
ties that “develop over time… together with the individual [and group] characteristics that 
change over time” (Veenstra & Steglich, 2011, p.598). These “network change[s] constitute a 
mutually dependent feedback process” (Veenstra & Steglich, 2011, p.502) as information is 
exchanged during the interactions. Over time patterns of behavior emerge from the 
interaction which then gain strength over time and give rise to norms which subsequently 
affect the group and its members (Bordia et al., 1999; Lewin, 1943a).  
These interpretations and arguments point to the fact that studying groups without 
understanding the unit forming processes which give rise to their existence as well as the fact 
that groups change systematically over time is erroneous (Arrow et al., 2003) As a result the 
conceptualisation of „a group‟ by the MG studies is problematic. Moreover, it can even be 
argued that in their pursuit for experimental control the studies became too minimal to the 
extent that they lost the essential features of a group (Durrheim et al., 2016; Sutton & 
Douglas, 2013;).   
6.2. Errors with the Tajfel Matrices  
 
An abundance of literature has raised concerns around the instruments used in the MG studies 
(Aschenbrenner & Shaefer, 1980; Condor 1990, Spears et al., 2001, Brewer & Silver, 1978; 
Hertel & Kerr, 2001, Bornstein, Crum, Wittenbraker, Harring, Insko, Thibaut, 1983a; Gerard 
& Hoyt, 1994). Critics point out what are believed to be a variety of systematic errors within 
the design of the instruments and as a result may have affected the interpretability of the 
study data. 
 






 6.1. Extreme scoring design of the matrices  
 
The MG studies found that participants not only favoured their own groups but that they also 
selected the option of maximizing the difference in the rewards between the ingroup and 
outgroup (Tajfel et al., 1971). The studies concluded that categorisation of people into groups 
is sufficient to give rise to discriminatory responses to the extent that members will often 
favour their ingroups even at the expense of the outgroup (Brown & Gaertner, 2001). 
These significant findings however have been attributed to the extreme arrangement of scores 
on the matrices. On the left side of the matrix (see Figure 2) for example, a member could opt 
to allocate a relatively large reward (e.g. 25) to another member of the ingroup, but another 
member of the outgroup would receive a slightly less reward (e.g. 19). The opposite was true 
on the right side of the matrix where the participant could allocate a very small amount to the 
ingroup (e.g. 1) while the outgroup would obtain an even larger reward (e.g. 7). In addition, 
while the matrices included allocation strategies that emphasized „joint profit‟, the majority 
of participants chose point distributions which maximized the difference between group 
outcomes. For these reasons some scholars argue that the design of the matrices may have 
substantially shaped participant responses to the point of even setting up the conditions for 
ingroup favouritism to occur (Bornstein, et al., 1983a ; Hertel & Kerr, 2001,).  
6.3. Demand characteristics and social desirability effects  
 
Other than extreme scoring, researchers claim that the method of using matrices to study 
group behaviour may have produced demand characteristics and social desirability effects. 
Gerard and Hoyt (1974 in Blank, 1997, p.39) for example argue that “the presence of the 
group membership information in the matrices gives a strong clue to a plausible interpretation 
of an otherwise rather strange task, namely, dividing money between two anonymous 
people”. This suggests that the information present on the matrices prompted participants on 
how to allocate their rewards – that is, in such a way “make[s] a difference where a difference 
is provided” (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974 in Blank, 1997, p.39).  
Harstone and Augoustinos (1995, p.188-189) further claim that “[t]here may be something 
particular about the dichotomous categorisation [of the matrices] which elicits ingroup 
favouritism and outgroup discrimination”. A two group context, the scholars argue, makes 
group differentials more obvious, causing for the situation to be easily interpreted as „us‟ and 




group setting. The studies found that in a three group setting ingroup favouritism was not as 
distinct (Harstone & Augoustinos, 1995). The absence of significant intergroup 
discrimination within the three group setting confirmed their claims about the matrices 
having elicited demand characteristics.  
Brewer and Silver (1978) similarly contend that the matrices were structured in such a way 
that reward allocations to either an ingroup or outgroup member were obligatory. This 
produced a „forced choice‟ structure that automatically superimposed a competitive strategy 
among participants making the act of favouring one‟s own group inevitable (Brewer & Silver, 
1978). Furthermore, it has been argued that the matrices in their limited reward allocation 
strategies coerced participants to select a less than ideal preference which was ingroup 
favouritism, making it possible to assume then that the structure of the matrices may have 
prohibited the occurrence of alternative forms of group behaviour (Bornstein et al., 1983a).  
7. The Virtual Interaction Application Platform 
 
At present there is a need to re-envision the MG studies to address some of its shortcomings. 
In 2011 Durrheim & Quayle developed a lab-based experimental software named the Virtual 
Interaction APPLication (VIAPPL) for behavioural research. Having acknowledged “that 
social identities and norms emerge in interaction, and [recognised] the need for dynamic 
explanations of the conversations and change of social structures and outcomes” (Durrheim 
& Quayle, 2012, p. 1), the scholars offered the experimental technology as a solution for 
conducting such research.  
VIAPPL is a platform that allows researchers to replicate the MG studies in an environment 
that facilitates the exploration and observation of patterns of interaction between individuals 
and groups. The software presents the MG in a game format capable of running multiple 
games simultaneously while storing intricate and detailed game information on a database 
(Durrheim & Quayle, 2012). The game titled “Give and Get” is designed for groups to 
allocate token rewards to other players which are either members of the ingroup or outgroup 
over a 40 round period. Players are at liberty to adopt their own strategies as they allocate 
tokens. Groups are arranged in a virtual arena and represented by circular colour-coded 
avatars (See Figure 3) (e.g. purple vs green group). As groups interact, feedback is provided 
to the players and displays how groups allocated their tokens after each round (Durrheim & 
Quayle, 2012). Thus the developing and on-going interactions are visible to all those within 




are currently limited to “transferring „tokens‟ from player to player, future implementations 
will allow additional [interactions] in the future [such as] moving within the game arena, and 
messaging other players” (Durrheim & Quayle, 2012, p.1).  
Figure 3: Virtual arena demonstrating social interaction between groups where 












The present research aimed to investigate the interactions of minimal groups in conditions of 
varying social status in order to study the influence of status on the token allocation patterns 
of groups. Games were set up in conditions of social equality and inequality and the resultant 
interactions were compared. This method provides a promising solution for more innovative 
ways of studying groups in ways that previous research on minimal groups has previously 
lacked. Unlike the isolated pen and paper task, the experiment transpires over a number of 
game rounds and therefore retaining the temporal and evolving aspect of group behaviour. 
The methodological strength of this novel interactive design is that social action is in context, 
meaning that members of groups have the opportunity of making sense of their responses in 





Chapter Three: Aim and rationale 
 
Social psychological research has established that people are inclined to develop identities 
based on group membership when they are categorised into groups. The Tajfel et al. (1971) 
„Minimal Group‟ (MG) studies, is one of the most influential experimental studies of 
intergroup relations. Results of the study found that a large number of participants favoured 
members of their own groups by significantly rewarding it more resources and this often 
ensued at the cost of maximising absolute gains to the ingroup over the outgroup (Turner, 
1987). This behaviour was termed as “ingroup favouritism”; the tendency to favour one‟s 
own group over the outgroup whether in attitudes, behaviour, preference or perception 
(Brown, Tajfel & Turner, 1980).  
 
These results were further explained by the Social Identity Theory (SIT) which ascribed the 
strong incidence of ingroup favouritism to psychological reasons of the need for a social 
identity. A social identity was referred to an individual‟s knowledge of who they are based on 
their group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Research has determined that status as an 
indicator of a group‟s relative position on an evaluative dimension however also plays a 
substantial role in social group behaviour (Hertal & Kerr, 2001; Huberman, Lock & Onculer, 
2004; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987; Rabinowitz, 1999;). Status has been shown to be a 
moderator of people‟s social identity often serving as an incentive and motivating factor for 
groups (Ellemers, 1993; Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005; Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg, 
1993,).  Additionally, research has highlighted that the status of groups is characteristically 
defined by the social structure which guides how groups interact within the various contexts 
(). In environments of social inequality, groups are said to be more likely to display ingroup 
favouritism and outgroup antagonism, whilst groups in socially equal contexts are more 
likely to display cooperation, fairness and empathy (Allport, 1954; Brown, 1978; Gaertner, 
Dovido, Anastasio & Rust, 1993; Smith, Jackson & Sparks; 2003). 
 
  
While the MG studies were a pioneer for social group research, they have received strong 
criticism for their methodological design. The first argument suggests that in removing social 
interaction the studies became too minimal to the extent of omitting a component vital to the 
understanding of social group formation, processes and continuation (Durrheim, Quayle, 
Tredoux, Titlestad & Tooke, 2016; Sutton & Douglas, 2013;). Evidence claims that groups 




another and make meaning of their behaviours (Bordia, DiFonzo & Chang, 1999; Durrheim 
et al., 2016). During this process members of groups not only prescribe to one another the 
kinds of attitudes, behaviours and norms that are appropriate within those social contexts, but 
they also collaboratively negotiate their social identities (Goffman, 1959, 1963). The original 
studies interpreted groups merely as labels and failed to take into account normative social 
influence in governing and motivating the development of group behaviours (Doyal & Harris, 
1986; Rimal & Real, 2005; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959;).  
To address these limitations the present research conducted the studies within an experiential 
interactive computer game environment named „Give and Get‟, facilitated by the Virtual 
Interactive Application (VIAPLL) software programme. The software provided a platform 
representing an ingroup-outgroup scenario whereby in each game participants allocated to 
one of two groups could interact virtually with one another during the tasks which involved 
allocating tokens to other members of a group. The game presented a virtual arena on which 
the ingroup and outgroup was physically displayed and the actual members of both groups 
remained anonymous.  
During the games social ties representing the token allocations from a group member to 
another group member were displayed and players insight into the giving strategies adopted 
by others. In this way social processes between groups could arise both naturally and 
normatively without predefined boundaries. This also related to the second criticism of the 
studies regarding the temporal and evolving nature of social group behaviour. Scholars have 
argued that group processes that are unique to groups are in actual fact a diachronic 
progression and place in the form of social networks as members of groups interact with one 
another, where social behaviours normatively emerge over time (Condor, 1990; Veenstra & 
Steglich, 2011).  
The original MG studies studied group behaviour as a once off non-interactive event where 
participants simply allocated resources between groups on a piece of paper during one 
experiment (Durrheim et al., 2016). The present study conducted the experiments over a 40 
game round period to allow normative behaviours of token giving to develop in an on-going 
manner over time.  
Furthermore, critics have pointed out systematic errors in the Tajfel matrices - the 




in such a way that it meant that on one end a member could either allocate a relatively large 
reward to the ingroup while the outgroup would receive a slightly less reward. On the other 
end of the matrix a member could allocate a very small reward to the ingroup while 
rewarding the outgroup with a larger reward (Tajfel et al., 1971). This extreme scoring design 
is believed to have elicited the strong finding of ingroup favouritism where participants 
almost automatically chose point distributions which maximized the difference between 
group outcomes (Aschenbrenner & Shaefer, 1980; Bornstein, Crum, Whitaker, Harring, 
Insko & Thibaut, 1983a;) Other scholars have further linked the matrices to demand 
characteristics and social desirability effects, suggesting that the matrices in their scoring 
served as guidelines as to how groups are to respond (Gerard & Hoyt, in Blank 1997; 
Harstone & Augoustinos, 1995). The present study addressed these concerns by adopting an 
experiential computer game rather than a matrix design. The games represented ingroup-
outgroup relations on a virtual arena and allocation strategies were not imposed. Moreover, 
groups could only allocate one token reward at a time without maximizing or minimizing 
group token difference. 
Study objectives  
 
The objectives of the research were to:  
1. Test the effects of group membership on participants.  
2. Test the effects of status on the  token giving behaviours of groups  
3. To compare token giving behaviours of groups within the socially equal and unequal 
conditions to determine which would be more likely to display higher levels of 
ingroup favouritism. 
4. To compare and determine which groups between low and high status in conditions of 
social inequality would be more discriminatory and less likely to give tokens to the 
outgroup. 
Study hypotheses  
 
The study proposed the following general hypotheses for the effects of the experimental 
manipulations: 
 




H2: Groups in the social inequality condition will engage in less outgroup giving than groups 
in the social equality condition.  
H3: Low status groups will be more discriminatory by engaging in less outgroup giving than 








This research adopted a combination of the two most basic experimental designs; the within - 
subjects design and between - subjects design. The research was conducted through the 
Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL), which was presented to the participants in the 
„Give and Get‟ game format.  
Participants were subjected to two treatment conditions; the individual (A) and intergroup 
(B). In the individual condition participants played the game without group membership. In 
the group condition participants were randomly assigned to a group and played the game as a 
group member. In each of the games participants had 40 rounds to allocate tokens resources 
to another participant, and they were expected to “give” one token per round. This design 
facilitated the observation of different interaction patterns and behaviours that would arise 
within the separate conditions.  
Table 2: Six group study of intergroup behavior 
 
Individual Condition   Group condition 










This study was part of a larger study of intergroup behaviour, Table 2 outlines the between-
groups factors within the overall study. The first game trial was a practice trial in which 
participants experienced the same conditions. In the second trial the between-subjects factors 
were manipulated: social equality and status. The first factor „social equality had two levels; 
equality and inequality. Status was nested within the social inequality condition and 
determined whether groups were of either of equal or low or high status. A total of 32 games 




There were also two additional experimental constants included in the design of the study. 
The first were the individual or group resource balances. In conditions of equality all groups 
received 20 tokens at the start of the game. In conditions of inequality, high status groups 
began the game with 30 tokens while low status groups began with 10 tokens. The second 
constant were social the ties between players. These formed as a result of token exchanges. 
Both of these experimental variables were visible to all players for the duration of the game.  
Study variables 
 
The present research sought to study the effect of social structure on group behaviour. To do 
this certain variables were identified, manipulated. By noting how the manipulated variables 
affected the response variable, the researcher was able to test whether a causal relationship 
existed between the variables.  
1) Independent variables (IV) 
Independent variables, also called factors, are experimental variables that are manipulated in 
an experiment, and are assumed to have a direct effect on the dependent variables. These 
variables stand alone. In this study three independent variables were defined; group (group, 
individual), equality (social equality, social inequality), and nested within the social 
inequality condition was status (low status, high status). 
2) Dependent variables (DV) 
Dependent variables are those that a researcher measures after manipulating the IVs and are 
assumed to affect the DV. The DV in the current experiment was defined as „outgroup 
giving‟.   
Sampling 
 
The sample consisted of participants of various ages and gender drawn from the student 
population enrolled at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The study 
did not require a specific population and therefore a convenience sample method was 
employed, whereby participants utilized for the research were those freely available at the 
time and willing to take part in the study (Gravetter & Forzano, 2009).  
 
Convenience sampling is a form non-probability sampling where selection of participants is 
based on the researcher‟s judgment rather than the statistical code of randomness (Terre 




directly asked to participate in the research. This sampling method was especially suitable for 
this research due to its efficiency in gathering participants. Active recruiting of participants 
occurred only during the early stages of data collection. As knowledge of the study quickly 
spread among the students, recruiting was no longer required, and sign-up sheets were 
created and put up instead, where participants could sign up to take part in the experiments. 
The limitation to this sampling method however is that results in a sample are not truly 
randomly selected from the population.  
Data Collection 
 
Data collection took place between May and August 2013. The data were collected by a team 
of students, including the researcher, all involved in the larger study of intergroup behaviour. 
The present study only used a systematically defined subset of the data collected during this 
duration.   
1. Procedure 
 
Data collection took place at the Psychology Laboratory at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus. The laboratory consisted of two rooms; a larger room containing 
fourteen computers and a smaller separate room containing a „control terminal‟ computer and 
a fingerprint scanner. The „Give and Get‟ games were run on the network of computers in the 
laboratory. Before being led into the larger room, the right index fingers of the participants 
were scanned and saved. If an individual had previously participated this would be indicated 
on the computer and the participant was asked to leave.    
 
After being seated at a computer informed consent was given and instructions explaining the 
“Give and Get” game procedure were offered. All participants then logged onto the 
computers which took them to the game. After being randomly categorised into groups by the 
software, participants proceeded with the game which involved them allocating one token per 
round to any member of their choice.  
 
Once the game was complete participants signed the incentive collection sheet and collected 
their incentives. All information including the giver of the tokens, the receiver, the group 
information, time elapsed between giving as well as rounds and trials were all saved onto the 







Participants that were prepared to take part in the experiments received an incentive in the 
form of a twenty Rand note for simply participating in the research. The use of the incentive 
was essential to effectively encourage participation. Participation however was voluntary and 
no undue inducement took place. Informed consent included participants receiving 
appropriate information regarding the research and their roles before agreeing to participate 
(Gravetter & Forzano, 2009). The participants received forms providing simple information 
about the researcher and procedures of the experiment. On these forms participants could 
voluntarily decide whether or not to assent. 
 
Very minor deception was used in the study whereby not all information regarding the 
purpose of the research was offered to participants at the beginning of the experiments. 
Specifically, participants also believed that they had been categorised into one of two groups 
based on their preference between two paintings. Group categorisation was in fact random. 
Deception through the aesthetic preference test was necessary so as to control for an 
extraneous variable, which was artist preference somehow affecting the token allocation of 
participants. Moreover, this deception was important to ensure that participants were equally 
divided into two groups as unequal groups would have resulted in a confounding variable. 
The participants were however debriefed and provided this information afterwards. 
 
2. Data Collection 
 
Although all information regarding participants was stored, their responses were not linked to 
their names or any other information by which they could be identified. In other words, 
participants remained entirely anonymous and their participation remained confidential. All 
data from the games was archived to be used in case of verification in the future. This possible 
use of data was made known to participants in the information sheet.  
Validity, Reliability and Generalisability 
 
Various strategies were implemented in order to ensure the internal validity, reliability and 




1. Internal validity 
 
Internal validity of research pertains to the ability to draw causal conclusions from the 
research (Terre Blanche, Durrheim, Painter, 2006). An internally valid design yields findings 
that are robust and replicable and where there are no confounds that might serve as plausible 
alternative explanations.  
 
Deception was necessary for this research in order to observe behaviour as it naturally 
unfolds and to set up the minimal group situation. Any detailed information regarding the real 
purpose of the research if given to participants at the beginning of the experiments may have 
a  potential influence the participants‟ performance yielding inaccurate findings as a result of 
response bias and threatening the internal validity of the study. Therefore offering vital 
information only after the games was necessary to achieve experimental control. 
 
To prevent the same people from participating repeatedly a fingerprint scanner which kept 
record of all individuals who participated in the study was used during data collection. This 
was important for the validity of the study due to testing effects. Testing effects are the 
changes in participant behaviour during subsequent tests due to the reactive nature of 
participants in the experiments (Campbell, 1957). Repeated involvement in the study would 
also limit the generalisability of the results. 
 
These reactive effects of participation may have posed a threat to the internal validity of the 
study. Participants were not provided detailed instructions regarding token allocations and 
were simply informed that they could adopt whichever strategies they wished to. Due to the 
repetitive nature of the experiment it was important to consider that participants may have 
unconsciously behaved in ways they thought the researcher anticipated, possibly affecting the 
outcome of the experiment.  
 
Moreover, during data collection a team of experimenters were randomly assigned games to 
run to ensure reliability. This was necessary in order to prevent an experimenter effect during 
data collection which may have occurred if each experimenter collected data specific to their 
„own‟ study. 
2. Reliability  
 
Reliability refers to ensuring that methods of data collection lead to consistent results (Terre 




of ingroup favouritism; namely ingroup and outgroup giving as recorded reliably over a 40 
game round period by the VIAPPL software.  
 
The “Give and Get” game 
1. Categorisation 
 
After participants had been recruited they were invited to participate in a computer-based 
experiment game named „Give and Get‟. In the first part of the game, similarly to the original 
MG studies, participants completed an „aesthetic preference test‟ by indicating their 
preference between two pieces of abstract art (Klee and Kandinsky) (see Figure 4). 
Participants were then ostensibly divided into one of two groups based on their chosen 
preference; this group categorisation was in actual fact random. While the psychology 
laboratory could accommodate up to twenty individuals, a maximum of fourteen participants 
were used per study. This was to ensure that there would be two perceptually distinct groups 
in all games and that the participant pool was not exhausted.   



















2. Game Conditions 
 
Group Condition 
The participants played the game as either individuals (A) or as members of a group (B).  
Although the study sought to observe and draw conclusions solely about groups, an 
individual control condition was also created where participants were not categorised into 
groups. This design was implemented to enable comparison of results between individuals 
and groups which would possibly arise as a result of the categorization effect (Tajfel et al., 
1971).   
In the group condition circular avatars representing the players differed in colour depending 
on the group categorisation. The colours yellow and purple (see Figure 6) for example 
represented two different groups in the intergroup condition. These circular avatars were all 
represented in one colour however when in the individual condition (see Figure 5). 




























Equality condition  
Each individual or group began the game with a set token balance. This balance depending on 
the status of the game would be evenly or unevenly distributed among the individuals or 
groups. For example in the inequality condition resources were allocated to players unevenly, 
some individuals or groups began the game with 30 tokens while others or those in the other 
group received 10 tokens. This starting balance was distributed among participants randomly.  
Status condition (nested within social inequality)  
 
In conditions of social inequality players could be socially ranked. This meant that players 
began the game with an uneven number of tokens and thus giving rise to low or high status 
rank. This occurred within both individual and group conditions. Using the aforementioned 
example, individuals or groups starting the game with a balance 30 tokens were of a high 
status, compared to those of low status that began with a balance of 10 tokens. The concept of 
„social rank‟ however was not disclosed to participants. 
3. Resource Allocations 
 
Resource allocations were made by the players per round. Participants were told that they 




players could allocate tokens to other individuals or themselves, whereas in the intergroup 
condition they could make two types of allocations; to a member of their group (ingroup) or a 
member outside of their group (outgroup). Participants also had the option of allocating 
tokens to themselves (self-giving); and this act was still considered as ingroup favouritism. 
On the bottom left of the screen was a box indicating a balance count (see Figure 5) defining 
the amount of tokens the player began with as well as how many they had after each round.  
Unlike previous MGP experiments the “Give and Get” game allowed interaction between 
participants. The game represented each participant as a small circular avatar. All avatars of 
the players were positioned in a circular arrangement on the screen. Each participant saw 
their own avatar represented with a bold outline. The group positioning of avatars alternated 
so that no participant was ever virtually positioned adjacent to an ingroup member.  
To allocate tokens participants clicked on another circle (ingroup or outgroup member) of 
their choice. This circle was then bolded to represent their allocation choice. Players could 
change their allocation by simply clicking on another circle. Once having decided on whom 
to allocate the token to, a line illustrating a social tie between the two avatars appeared (see 
Figure 7). When all fourteen players had allocated their tokens a summary diagram (see 
Figure 8) was provided after each round, which illustrated how tokens within that round had 
been exchanged. In addition, the diagram displayed the accrued token balance for each player 
after each round.  





Figure 8: Summary diagram after each game round illustrating resources 







Chapter Five: Data Analysis 
 
The research adopted a descriptive approach and strictly used a quantitative method. The 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse interactions and flows 
between players to determine their token allocation strategies adopted during the games. 
More specifically, the study was concerned with measuring and reporting on patterns of 
outgroup giving among three precise conditions;  
1. Group condition: where participants had played the game as either individuals (A) or 
as members of a group (B),  
2. Equality condition: where resources depending on the status of the game had been 
evenly (social equality condition) or unevenly (social inequality condition) distributed 
among the individuals or groups, 
3. Status Condition: in conditions of social inequality where individuals or groups were 
socially ranked as either of low or high status. 
 
1. Outgroup giving  
 
In order to measure ingroup favouritism the study measured instances of outgroup giving 
among the players. Players had the choice of either allocating tokens to members of their 
ingroups or the outgroup, however self-giving was also an option. Self-giving in this study 
was defined as the action where players allocated tokens to themselves. Although these acts 
were perceived and measured as independent responses in this study, they still fell under 
ingroup giving. As a result, ingroup giving was confounded with self-giving and thus 
requiring a more complex form of measurement. Outgroup giving however mirrored ingroup 
giving without self-giving, and was chosen as a more reliable measure of ingroup favouritism 
for the present study.  
2. Coded Data: MS Excel 
 
The data produced in the present study was of a quantitative nature. The data was recorded 
and saved by the Virtual Interactive APPLication (VIAPPL) and later exported to MS Excel. 
The recorded data that was already coded by the software was comprehensive and detailed 




3. Analysis: SPSS  
 
The data from the game were imported to SPSS and coded appropriately. Overall this data 
included;  
Game name, Equality (inequality or equality), Status (low or high status), Group (individual 
or group), Trial number, Round number, Participant ID, Tokens to ingroup (ingroup giving), 
and Tokens to outgroup (outgroup giving).  
4. Binomial Data 
 
The study experiment was binomial in nature. A binomial experiment is a one where there are 
a number of trials and where each trial is independent of the others. There are typically only 
two outcomes and the probability of each outcome remains constant from trial to trial 
(Andrews University, 2005). The data outcomes were for each round; two dependent 
variables (DV) were recorded for each player. These included: 
1) Ingroup giving: yes (1) or no (0) 
2) Outgroup giving: yes (1) or no (0) 
 
5. Generalized Linear Mixed Model 
 
In statistical analyses the usual principal is to apply the simplest statistical test and to ensure 
that it is applied accurately. In many cases however the series of assumptions upon which 
such tests are based are violated by real world experimental data such as in the repeated 
measures design of the present study. Assumptions generally violated for include; normality, 
homogeneity of variances and independence of data.  In order to overcome these violations, 
the present study used the Generalised Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) to statistically analyse 
the binomial structure of the experimental data produced by the round-by-round token 
allocation design of the „Give and Get‟ game.  
 
GLMMs are a superset of Generalized Linear Models which combine properties of two 
statistical frameworks; the linear mixed models and generalized linear models. The GLLM 
procedure expands the general linear model so that the data are permitted to exhibit correlated 
and non-constant variability (Bolker, Brooks, Clark, Geange, Poulsen, Stevens & White, 
2009). The mixed linear model as a result is flexible in that it allows for the modeling of data 





The biggest advantage of GLMMs is that they allow for dependent variables to be samples 
from non-normal distributed data (Bolker et al., 2009). The „generalised‟ aspect of GLMM 
means that in contrast to linear regression, the experimenter is able to take into account the 
distribution which underlies the process of generating their data. For example in the present 
study binomial data produced was identified (Bolker et al., 2009). Furthermore, the mixed 
aspect allows for random effects as well as some degree of non-independence among 
observations. In the long run, this type of flexibility within GLMM approaches allows for 
researchers to apply more rigorous, realistic statistical models to their data (Bolker et al., 
2009). 
The assumptions of GLMMs are as follows (SPSS, 2007)  
 Dependent variables are linearly associated with fixed factors, random effects and 
covariates, 
 the fixed effect models the dependent variable‟s mean, 
 the random effect models the covariance aspect of the dependent variable, 
 multiple random effects are independent of one another, 
 the repeated measures models the covariance structure of the residuals,  




Chapter Six: Results 
 
Generalized Linear Models (GLMM) with binary logistic regressions were run using SPSS to 
test outgroup giving across the experimental factors. This distribution was appropriate as 
variables represented a binary response. Independent variables; group and social equality 
conditions were tested on the outgroup giving dependent variable. A second analysis tested 
differences in outgroup giving across the status conditions. Game „rounds‟ were specified as 
the random effect to model change over time.  
The GLM tested for main effects, two-way ANOVA with the alpha set at 0.05 to assess the 
overall model significance. A Bonferroni‟s correction was used to limit family wise error 
across the tests.  
6.1. Study variables 
 
Independent variables  
The first independent variable explored the effects of group categorisation/membership on 
token allocation strategies adopted by players. Group condition was the independent variable 
(IV) with two levels; 1) individual condition where participants had played the game as 
individuals only and 2) the minimal group condition where participants had been categorised 
in one of two groups and played the game as members of those groups  
The second independent variable explored the effects of social equality on token allocations 
of participants. The Equality condition had two levels; 1) the socially equal condition where 
tokens had been equally distributed among groups at the beginning of games and 2) the 
socially inequality condition where tokens had been distributed unequally among the groups 
at the start of the games.  
The third independent variable was the status condition nested in the social inequality 
condition, where an unequal distribution of tokens revealed groups of different statuses. This 
variable had two levels; high status and low status.  
Dependent variables  
The dependent variable (DV) in this analysis was the measure of outgroup giving, in other 
words, extent to which participants established less group-influenced strategies in their token 






1. Group Condition: Individual vs. Group condition 
 
It was expected that the players in the group condition would be more likely to allocate their 
tokens in a group-like manner. This means that patterns of token giving that resembled less 
outgroup giving and thus “groupness”, would occur more in the group condition as opposed 
to the individual condition. Results confirmed these predictions and displayed a significant 
fixed effect (F (13.3050=18.644, p= 0.000) for the analysis. Players in the group condition 
(M = 0.338) were less likely than those in the individual condition (M=0.507) to display 
outgroup giving. This meant that players in groups often allocated their tokens to members of 
their ingroups rather than the outgroup, whereas individuals who did not show such patterns 
in their token allocations. The individual condition instead yielded higher levels of outgroup 
giving, which represents idiosyncratic patterns of giving. The rate of these behaviours among 
players in the individual condition increased significantly over the rounds (β= 1.156, SE= 
0.252, p=0.000). These findings confirm H1: that players categorised into groups will display 
patterns of “groupness” in their token allocations.  









2. Equality condition: Social Equality vs. Social Inequality 
 
Outgroup giving was investigated and compared between groups in the social equality and 
social inequality condition. Results however found no fixed effect for social equality on 
outgroup giving (F (13.305) = 20.828, p= 0.501). Nonetheless outgroup giving was found to 
be numerically higher among groups in the social equality condition and increased over the 
rounds (β= 0.061, SE= 0.024, p= 0.013). This means that groups in the social inequality 
condition engaged in less outgroup giving than groups in the social equality condition, and 
thus confirming H2.  
3. Status condition: Low vs. High Status  
 
Outgroup giving was investigated among low and high status groups. It was expected that 
low status groups would engage in less outgroup giving compared to high status groups and 
thus be more discriminatory. Results of the experiments displayed a significant fixed effect 
for status (F=20.828, df =13.305, p= 0.000). High status groups displayed significantly higher 
levels of outgroup giving (M: 0.471) than low status groups (0.371). In addition, outgroup 
giving increased among high status groups over the 40 game round periods (β= 0.959, 
SE=0.267) whereas in low status groups it did not. These findings confirmed H3; low status 
groups were more discriminatory than high status groups and engaged in less outgroup giving 
than high status groups. 






4. Interactions  
1. Two-way interaction: group condition and equality condition 
 
A test was run to determine if there would be an interaction effect between the equality and 
group conditions. Results yielded a significant interaction effect (F (13.3015) =7.945, p= 
0.005). The effect of social equality differs as a function of the group condition. This meant 
that the difference in outgroup giving between individual and group conditions was highest in 
the social inequality condition. Groups in the social inequality conditions demonstrated the 
lowest levels of outgroup giving overall (M= 0.361). Groups in the social equality condition 
were more likely to display higher levels of outgroup giving (M=0.38). This demonstrated 
that patterns of token allocations among groups differed in various conditions of social 
equality. These results further confirmed H2. Outgroup giving among individuals in socially 
equal and socially unequal conditions varied slightly.  Players in the individual conditions 
were most likely to engage in outgroup giving (M=0.509) (M=0.506).  
Figure 10: Outgroup giving pairwise contrast of estimated means for the Social 
Equality and Group variable interaction 
 
2. Two-way interaction: Group condition and Status condition 
 
A test was run to determine if there would be an interaction effect between the status and 
social equality conditions. Results determined a significant interaction effect (F (13.305) 




of social equality differed as a function of status. That is, the difference in outgroup giving 
between low and high status groups conditions was highest in the social inequality condition, 
confirming both H2 and H3. High status had the biggest effect on outgroup giving and these 
groups engaged in the highest levels of outgroup giving (M= 0.48). Outgroup giving was 
lowest among low status groups (M=0.296), suggesting that these groups showed the greatest 
levels of ingroup favouritism overall in the study, as they were the least likely to share their 
tokens with the outgroup giving. There were no notable differences in outgroup giving among 
groups in the equality condition (M=0.46, M=0.44).   
Figure 11: Outgroup giving pairwise contrast of estimated means for the Social 
Equality and Status variable interaction 
 
 
3. Two way interaction: Group condition and Status condition  
 
The final test was run to determine if there would be an interaction effect between the status 
and group conditions. The results of the analysis yielded a significant interaction effect 
between the two conditions (F(13.305) =7.038, p= 0.000). Findings displayed that the biggest 
difference in outgroup giving occurred among individuals and groups of high status. High 
status groups (M= 0.366) were more likely than low status groups to engage in outgroup 
giving (M= 0.321). Outgroup giving among low status groups was the lowest overall status 






Figure 12: Outgroup giving pairwise contrast of estimated means for the Status 



















Chapter Seven: Discussion 
 
Previous knowledge around groups had claimed that they are a reflection of people who share 
common goals and identities (Sherif, 1936). Tajfel, Billing, Bundy & Flament (1971) 
however believed otherwise and created experiments that would study the most basic 
conditions necessary for the formation of a group. According to the scholars, “groupness” 
would be demonstrated by behaviour that resembles ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
discrimination (Brown, Tajfel & Turner, 1980). The results of the minimal group study 
confirmed their expectations. Groups displayed significant behaviours of ingroup 
favouritism, even at the expense of the outgroup. It was concluded as a result that the simple 
act of categorising people into groups is enough to prompt group-like behaviour in favour of 
the ingroup (Allen & Wilder, 1975). 
 
The present research along with other scholars however argued that results of these studies 
are problematic primarily because of the manner in which the idea of a group was 
conceptualised and consequently operationalized (Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 1980; 
Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titlestad & Tooke, 2016; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi & Shiontsuka, 
1993;). The research argues that groups are far more intricate than individuals simply sharing 
a social category. Instead groups are social systems that contain processes and dynamics that 
resemble meaningful information as individuals interact with one another (Bordia, DiFonzo 
& Chang, 1999; Goffman, 1959;). Therefore, interaction is an essential building block of 
groups and group behaviour.  
 
The present research replicated the MG studies rather in an interactive platform, whereas the 
original studies‟ utilised pen and paper methods that did not allow interaction between 
participants. This method of study as a result allowed for minimal groups to be studied in 
environments that could start unravelling the many complex processes that occur in group 
settings that the classic studies overlooked. The findings of the study distinctly revealed the 
normative nature of social activity that occurs amongst groups. Moreover, these patterned 
activity when observed across the conditions were shown to differ in comparison as a result 
of the experimental conditions.  
 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) was later developed to further expand on the findings of the MG 
studies and offered psychological interpretations of the likelihood that members of groups 




social identity, which was referred to a person‟s self-concept of who they are based on their 
group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1978). Due to the fact that social identity contributes to 
feelings of self-worth, the theory proposed that people as a result would be motivated to 
favour their own groups. There has been other research however that has demonstrated that 
status moderates people‟s social identity, to the extent of influencing whether or not members 
actually favour their ingroups over the ougroups (Ellermers, 1993; Hertal & Kerr, 
2001;Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). These effects of status were unfortunately not explored in 
the MG studies since all groups were implicitly of equal status. The present research 
incorporated this aspect to its design, and tested the influence of status on the token giving 
patterns of the groups in various contexts of social equality. This section presents the 
discussion of the results of the study. 
 
1. Re-envisioning the MG studies through interactive platform 
 
To study group behaviour under minimal conditions, the classic MG studies used a pen and 
paper task as their methodological instrument. On the paper were matrices containing a top 
row for allocations made to the ingroup and the bottom row contained those for the outgroup. 
After having been categorised participants simply had to allocate resources to another 
member of either the ingroup or outgroup. Allocation strategies were provided for how 
participants could allocate their rewards. These were arranged in such a way that one could 
either choose between fairness, maximum joint profit, ingroup favouritism or outgroup 
favouritism (Tajfel et al.,1971). This methodology however has been criticised by scholars 
who believe that by having removed interaction from the design of the experiments, the 
studies became too minimal and failed to capture the characteristic features of social 
processes involved in the formation and activity of groups (Sutton & Douglas, 2013; 
Durrheim et al., 2016,). Secondly, it is supposed that extreme arrangement of scores between 
the ingroup and outgroup on the matrices elicited the general responses of ingroup 
favourisitsm from groups, suggesting the presence of demand characteristics and forced 
choice (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Bornstein et al., 1983a; Aschenbrenner & Shaefer, 1980; 
Harstone & Augoustinos, 1995).  
 
The present research supported the need to re-envision the studies in a context that addresses 
these concerns (Durrheim et al., 2016). VIAPPL – a technological platform that facilitates 
interaction between minimal groups was utilised instead for the research. The software 




setting could not only actively interact with one another, but their interactions were also made 
visible in the form of social networks and ties. This served as an advantage as it illuminated 
the dynamic nature of group processes involved in group formation and behaviour. The 
experiments were also run over a multiple game periods, which allowed for the temporal 
aspect of social activity to be captured (Durrheim & Quayle, 2012). This design did not 
implicitly or explicitly impose limits on the participants they instead were free to determine 
their own responses.  
 
2. Ingroup favouritism 
 
Ingroup favouritism in the experiments encompassed every act of ingroup giving that 
occurred during games. In other words, this constituted every time that a member of a group 
gave a token to a member of their own group. The design of the games also allowed for 
participants to allocate tokens to themselves and this was referred to as self-giving. Self-
giving was a startling finding because of its unexpected occurrence. The strategy emerged 
normatively among players without plan and was neither encouraged nor discouraged. It was 
believed that self-giving was adopted with intentions of maximizing independent gain. Self-
giving was confounded with ingroup giving and as a result posed constraints on the 
measurements of ingroup favouritism. The present research as a result used outgroup giving 
as a more reliable measure of ingroup favouritism because it mirrored ingroup favouritism 
without self-giving. Outgroup giving referred to every act where members allocated their 
tokens to members of the outgroup. Consequently, these behaviours could be used to interpret 
whether groups were more likely to favour their ingroups. That is, if they displayed less 
actions of outgroup giving that means they were more likely to allocate their tokens to 
members of their groups.  
2.1.  Testing the social categorisation theory 
 
In order to confirm the conclusions of the MG studies, that group behaviour can arise even in 
the most minimal conditions due to social categorisation, the present research sought to test 
this. Experiments were conducted in two specific conditions. The first was the individual 
player condition where players during the games were all represented by the same coloured 
avatar (e.g. grey). This means that players has not been categorised into groups. Contrarilyin 




half was represented by a yellow avatar. This means that players had been randomly 
categorised into one of the two groups.  
 
The findings of the experiments displayed distinct differences in the patterns of token giving 
among the conditions. The individual player condition yielded no evidence of an arrangement 
of ongoing and group relational ties between players. Instead interactions in this condition 
were rather a series of idiosyncratic exchanges between players that did not necessarily 
highlight any discrete patterns. In the group player condition however, distinct and sequential 
patterns between players were identified. Relational ties tended to represent arrangements 
between players that shared the same coloured avatars. This meant that interactions of players 
categorised into groups were more likely to resemble “groupness” – the sense of belonging or 
sharing relational connectedness. The MG studies defined this phenomenon as ingroup 
favouritism. Therefore these findings confirmed the H3 of present study as well as claims 
made by the original studies that categorisation of people into groups and the mere 
knowledge of the existence of another group, is adequate to trigger intergroup competitive 
responses. These responses would most likely resemble members favouring their own groups, 
even at the expense of the outgroup (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Brown & 
Gaertner, 2001).  
3. Social ties, norms and the evolving nature of group interactions 
 
In seeking experimental control the MG studies removed many factors they deemed 
unnecessary for group behaviour, including interaction. It has been contested however that 
the studies may have been too minimal (Sutton & Douglas, 2013; Durrheim et al., 2016). 
Some scholars argue that groups are typically marked by processes that emerge, evolve and 
are established over time as groups interact with one another (Goffman, 1959; Lewin, 1943a;, 
Veenstra & Steglich, 2011). Therefore groups generally feature social ties between members 
that are created by on-going interactions and feedback processes, as members of groups 
engage and make meaning of these interactions (Durrheim et al., 2016).  
 
The present study adopted this line of thinking and as a result used an interactive experiential 
software as a platform for investigating group behaviour. Findings of the study determined 
that token allocations among groups followed active and sequential patterns. When observed 
over the course of the 40 game round periods, findings also demonstrated that certain patterns 




evolving features of the patterns of interaction over time were indicators of change processes 
involved in group behaviour (Arrow, Poole, Henry, Wheelan & Moreland, 2004). These 
patterns represented „norms‟ that emerged and solidified as members of groups negotiated 
acceptable behaviours and consequently conformed. As a result, the research provided 
evidence for the dynamic and interactive nature of group behaviour and the substantial role 
that normative social influence as a group process plays as members of groups make meaning 
of their interactions (Doyal & Harris, 1986; Goffman, 1959; Hertal & Kerr, 2001; Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959;). Therefore, interaction served as a medium through which information could 
be communicated between groups and norms diffused. Thus interaction as a conduit of social 
influence and an essential component of group formation and behaviour was evident. These 
findings confirmed arguments challenging the MG study conceptualisation of groups as 
social categories rather than systems in which individuals are active in creating and making 
meaning of their behaviours through interaction (Douglas & Sutton, 2013; Durrheim et al., 
2016).  
4.  Influence of status on token giving behaviours of groups 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) claimed that people internalise their group membership and 
begin to define themselves in group personas which in turn binds them to their groups (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). Research however has shown the effects of status in moderating people‟s 
social identities and thus whether or not they will favour their own groups over the outgroup 
(Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton & Hume, 2001; Ellemers, 2003; Ellemers, Wilke & van 
Knippenberg, 2003;). Rabbie, Schot and Visser (1989) believed that ingroup favouritism in 
the MG studies rather reflected participants‟ desires to gain as many rewards as they could as 
opposed to seeking to enhance their self-esteem. The current research studied this influence 
of status on minimal groups, since groups in the original studies were implicitly of equal 
status and this aspect was not explored. The experiments set up conditions of social equality 
and inequality and observed resultant group behaviours.  
Findings of the study revealed that status significantly affected the token allocations of 
groups, influencing the extent to which members favoured their ingroups. There were clear 
differences in patterns of token giving between groups in the social equality and social 
inequality conditions. Groups in conditions of social equality were more likely to share their 
tokens with members of the outgroup, with this norm also increasing and solidifying over the 




result, groups in unequal status environments more likely to favour members of their ingroup. 
These findings confirmed the second hypothesis of present the study. They also were in line 
with research asserting that in contexts of social inequality, where status differentials are 
salient between groups, intergroup discrimination is accentuated and intergroup relations are 
often marked by ingroup favouritism and outgroup antagonism (Ellemers, Wilke, van 
Knippenberg, 1993; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje & Manstead, 2006; Smith, Jackson & Sparks, 
2003). Furthermore, results supported research that has shown that intergroup bias is often 
reduced in environments of social equality ( Gaertner, Dovido, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 
1993; Harding & Hogrete, 1952; Pettigrew, 1998). 
4.1. Are high status or low status groups more discriminatory? 
 
It is believed that in intergroup relations status impacts upon the perception of a group‟s 
worth. Groups ranking high in status are said to view themselves more highly than low status 
groups and as a result are more likely to favour their ingroups over the low status outgroups. 
For these reasons scholars argue that high status groups would be more discriminatory than 
low status groups (Ellemers, 1993). Similarly low status groupsare likely to disassociate 
themselves from their groups and favour the high status outgroup due to the low status 
ranking threatening their self-worth (Jost, 2001; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost and Burgress, 
2002; Jost, Pelham & Carvallo, 2002).  
The present research studied which of the two groups between low and high status groups 
would show higher levels of ingroup favouritism and thus be more discriminatory. Findings 
of the study determined that outgroup giving occurred significantly more among high status 
groups than low status groups. This meant that high status groups were more likely than low 
status groups to share their tokens with the outgroup. Moreover, members of high status 
groups conformed increasingly to the norm of outgroup giving, as these behaviours were 
found to increase and over the period of game rounds. Low status groups on the other hand 
were the least likely, of all groups in all experimental conditions, to share their tokens with 
outgroup members. Very low levels of ougroup giving were found among this group. These 
findings confirmed the third hypothesis of the study that low status groups engage in more 
ingroup favouritism compared to high status groups, and thus be more discriminatory. As a 
result, the findings disputed research claiming that high status groups are bound to be more 
discriminatory because high status boosts feelings of worth (Bettencourt et al., 2001; 




also challenged research suggesting members in low status groups distance themselves from 
their groups and in turn favour high status outgroups (Jost & Burgess, 2002; Sachdev & 
Bourhis, 1985, 1991).  
4.2. Challenging or maintaining the status quo through social competition  
  
Groups may generally resort to ingroup favouritism due to an internal instinct for self-
preservation and the pursuit for a more positive social identity (Commins & Lockwood, 
1979). Ingroup favouritism however also represents a form of identity conflict between the 
two groups as they fight for the top spot in the social relations (Maiese, 2004). The present 
research investigated the behaviours of high and low status groups in light of literature of 
social competition between groups of unequal status.  
Findings of the study demonstrated that low status groups were less likely than high status 
groups to allocate their tokens to the outgroup. This difference was by a substantial amount. 
Consequently this meant that low status groups engaged in substantial levels of ingroup 
favouritism. In the context of social competition these findings were interpreted as 
demonstrating competitive behaviours by low status groups to possibly challenge the status 
quo (Rubin, Badea, & Jetten, 2014; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje & Manstead, 2006; Wright, 
Taylor, Moghaddam, 1990;). High status groups conversely engaged in higher levels of 
outgroup giving, and thus were less likely to favour members of their ingroups in their token 
allocations. These behaviours from high status groups in contrast meant that they refrained 
from competing with low status groups in order to try and maintain their status (Scheepers & 
Ellemers, 2005).  
Explicit expressions of ingroup favouritism among low or high status groups are believed to 
be largely influenced by whether groups perceive status relations as just or unjust 
(Bettencourt et al., 2001; Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1997; Scheepers et al., 2006;;). In the 
present research, status was assigned randomly to groups, meaning that in light of this 
literature it is possible to assume that players most likely viewed the status relations as 
undeserved. The very high levels of ingroup favouritism amongst low status groups was 
therefore interpreted as these groups mobilizing as collectives to compete with high status 
groups for structural change, since the relations were unmerited (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1987;). Contrarily for high status groups, the unjustified 
status relations between the groups made them more willing to share their tokens with the 




research that claims that because the prospect of the social hierarchy being re-arranged 
members of high status groups will always seek to protect their status by demonstrating high 
levels of ingroup favouritism, regardless of how status relations were established (Ellemers, 




Chapter Nine: Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis provided a critique of the Minimal Group (MG) studies which have been a 
pioneer in group research. The classic studies had concluded that the social categorisation of 
people into groups alone is necessary to trigger group behaviour, which often results in 
ingroup favouritism. In the present study it was argued that the methodological design of the 
classic studies may have been too minimal, to the extent that groups were in fact not 
representative of every day group contexts. In pursuing experimental control the original 
studies removed interaction from their investigations of group behaviour. This research along 
with many other scholars however maintained that actual groups are characterised by 
relational ties between members that are created by temporal and on-going interactions 
(Bordia, DiFonzo & Chang, 1999; Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titestad, & Tooke, 2016; 
Goffman, 1959; Sutton & Douglas, 2013). Due to the fact that the MG studies omitted this 
aspect from their design the characteristic and more complex processes involved in the 
formation of groups and group behaviour was not analysed (Arrow, Poole, Henry, Wheelan 
& Moreland, 2004). The present research instead aimed to illuminate these processes as well 
as study the phenomenon of ingroup favouritism highlighted by the original studies in 
contexts of varying social status.  
The study used the Virtual Interactive APPLication (VIAPPL) to replicate the MG studies in 
an interactive environment. The software which reproduced the experiments in the format of 
computer games made it possible to achieve this aim. The data from the experiments fulfilled 
expectations of the research and were able to visibly display patterns of behaviour unique to 
groups as they unfold in time and space during interactions. The nature of the design allowed 
for the observation of group behaviour over a series of rounds rather than a once off event. 
Consequently, the data demonstrated the temporal and shifting nature of group behaviours in 
which individuals are active in producing, as they interact with one another and make 
meaning of their behaviours. Furthermore, the interactions among groups generally 
resembled normative patterns which often gained momentum as more members conformed to 
behaviours. This normative nature of group behaviour has been well established (Hertal & 
Kerr, 2001; Rimal & Read, 2005; Sherif, 1936; Ach, 1951). As a result, the present research 
built on this evidence to further highlight the evolutionary quality of group behaviour through 




Apart from the social categorisation theory, the scholars of the MG studies offered the Social 
Identity Theory (SIT) as an explanation to the study‟s findings. The theory claimed that 
people‟s social identities which arising when assigned to groups contributes to feelings of 
self-worth and increases the likelihood of ingroup favouritsim (Tajfel & Turner, 1978). 
Evidence has shown however that status often influences these social identities, which as a 
result affect whether or not members favour their own groups over the outgroup (Ellemers, 
1993; Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg, 1993;). The original MG studies did not capture 
this aspect as groups were implicitly of equal status. This present study, in contrast 
investigated the influence of status on the behaviours of minimal groups in an interactive 
environment. VIAPPL allowed for group experiments to be conducted in conditions of both 
social equality and social inequality in order to compare the arising patterns of behaviours. 
The data found differences in group behaviours among the two conditionsAs hypothesised, 
groups in socially unequal conditions were marked by ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
discrimination, whereas groups in socially equal conditions were more cooperative and 
shared their resources with the outgroup. Moreover, in conditions of social inequality low 
status groups were the most discriminatory and engaged in more frequent behaviours of 
ingroup favouritism, whilst high status groups displayed more willingness to distribute their 
tokens to members of the outgroup. As a result all hypotheses of the study were supported. 
VIAPPL proved to be a successful platform for achieving the aim and objectives of the 
present research. The recently designed experimental technology can be recommended to 
social psychological researchers that seek to further investigate social behaviour and 
communication between groups. The interactive design to studying groups yields social 
action that is not only in context but also highlights the active nature of individuals and 
groups as they build relations with one another over time to produce behaviour that is 
meaningful. Having practically demonstrated the methodological strength of this platform, 
the present research through its distinct approach consequently hopes to build renewed 




Chapter Ten: Limitations and Recommendations 
 
This section presents and discusses the limitations of the present study. Challenges 
experienced pertain to; weaknesses associated with using computer-based experimental 
designs, analysing non-normal experimental data and difficulties in generalising study 
conclusions. It also offers recommendations to the identified problems.  
Weaknesses in computer-based experiments 
1. Artificiality of experimental results  
 
One of the primary disadvantages of computer-based experiments is their artificiality. Some 
scholars argue that because computer simulations are unrealistic depictions of real life 
situations, they threaten the internal and external validity of research (Lowenstein, 1999). The 
replication feature typical of experiments is largely considered as not characteristic of 
everyday life (Lowenstein, 1999). These concerns raise questions around whether “the 
stylized form of experimental institutions allow for conclusions pertaining to the „real world” 
(Schram, 2005, p. 227).  
The experimental context of the “Give and Get” game was designed to induce the simplest 
conditions for meaningful interaction. However, within this minimal and representational 
environment resources carried no real value to participants. It is essential therefore to note 
that while some results were found to be significant, the allocation strategies adopted by 
participants may not have accurately and realistically depicted real life decision making as 
computer controlled contexts may stimulate more rational approaches to decision making and 
judgement that participants might not necessarily use in real life situations (Lowenstein, 
1999).  
It is also imperative to note that analytic techniques do not always produce meaningful results 
(Lowenstein, 1999). While all token allocations and outcomes were captured by the VIAPPL 
software and interpreted, this information was exclusively of a digital and quantitative nature. 
The beliefs, attitudes and motivations behind participant allocations to further explain 
findings however were unobservable and missing from this interpretation. Understanding 
participant internal motives are essential for a holistic and reliable interpretation of results. 
For these reasons a qualitative component to the research is recommended, possibly through 





Another restraint relates to user interface; which is the communication between the 
experimental participant and the computer. As simple as it was, the “Give and Get” game was 
technically limited only to those familiar with or unintimidated by computer machines. It is 
recommended therefore that in order to minimise issues associated with computer anxiety and 
intimidation, screen designs must be kept simple. As in the present study which implemented 
a trial run, participants similarly should have an opportunity to practice skills required in the 
experimental task to ease concerns.  
A key limitation of computer-controlled experiments involves problems with the machines 
themselves. At times deficiencies associated with the software were experienced and as a 
result experiments had to be started over or cancelled. Redoing experiments sometimes 
caused participants to be impatient, posing a threat to the internal validity of the study. It is 
therefore recommended that pilot tests be conducted in order to determine and debug any 
potential problems. As in the present study, it is also suggested that a small number of 
computers be used for experiments in order to avoid such concerns. Regardless of the 
suggested solutions the drawback associated with dealing with computers is that hitches may 
arise unexpectedly which is often out of the experimenter‟s control.  
Analysing non-normal experimental data  
1. Dealing with binary data 
 
When working with experimental data, tools for analysing and interpreting the data generally 
fall outside the range of methods often taught in introductory statistical methods (Bolker, 
Brooks, Clark, Geange, Poulden, Steven, & White, 2009). Non experimental studies often use 
normally distributed data which involve simple statistical methods which are straightforward 
to analyse and interpret. However the data produced in this study was binary. Binary refers to 
data where for each observation the data takes on two values (Bolker et al., 2009). For 
example in this study; the presence or absence of ingroup favouritism was binomial data with 
a single individual per observation. Unlike normal data, binary data provides more of a 
challenge. Advanced methods of analysis are often required which involve determining as 
well as fitting a model to the data.  
Another problem associated with binary data involves random effects. Random effects 
encompass variation among participants when multiple responses are measured per individual 




were measured on the same participants over game rounds and trials. Therefore, along with 
measuring the effects of certain predictor variables, this variation among units also had to be 
taken into account and measured. When faced with binary data some researchers may opt to 
ignore random effects altogether, however such shortcuts may fail and even when 
„successful‟, they often violate statistical assumptions or limit the scope of inference (Bolker 
et al., 2009).  
2. Generalized Linear Mixed Models analysis 
  
This study used the Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) to statistically analyse the 
experimental data from the “Give and Get” game. GLMMs are powerful in that they do not 
violate any of the aforementioned statistical assumptions (Bolker et al., 2009). They are also 
considered as one of the best tools for analysing binary data that involves random effects; 
however they can also prove to be quite a challenge.  
 
There is currently relatively limited literature and resources,such as video tutorials on the 
models and how to conduct them specifically for one‟s data. As a result, GLLMs may be 
difficult to implement. It was also noted that there is currently a lack available software 
packages to run the models. The present study utilised the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) to run the GLMMs, however this involved multiple trial and error methods 
as few guidelines were provided by the software on how to use and run the models.  
 
The estimation of the parameters of a statistical model is fundamental in many statistical 
analyses. Within GLMMs these parameters include the fixed-effect parameters (effects of 
covariates, differences among treatments and interactions) and random-effect parameters. For 
GLMMs, calculating these estimates was “at best slow, and at worst (e.g. for large numbers 
of random effects) computationally infeasible” (Bolker et al., 2009, p. 133). Although the 
models ran successfully, the average time taken to run each model was approximately 
between 8-12 hours. GLMMs are also known for being challenging to fit and statistical 
inferences such as hypothesis testing are often difficult to implement (Bolker et al., 2009). 
Selecting the best fit model in this study involved running multiple tests and selecting the test 
with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). However, the accuracy of this method was uncertain. 
 
Interpretation of the data output similarly was problematic, and involved intensive 




care in interpreting estimates and inferences. The overall experience of using GLMM 
although highly beneficial was regarded as a meticulous and tedious process. For these 
reasons it is recommended that researchers seeking to utilise this method proceed with 
caution before venturing into using GLMMs. It is also recommended that researchers receive 
considerable training beforehand for the understanding of theoretical underpinnings of 
GLMMs and using the appropriate software (Bolker et al., 2009).  
Generalisability of study results 
 
The sample used in the study consisted only of students enrolled at the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal who had volunteered to participate. By limiting the sample to one population 
the generalisability of study results were restricted. As a result, the extent to which the results 
of this study would arise among other populations is uncertain. Had the sample been drawn 
from a non-student population across several strata, it is possible that the subsequent data set 
may have contained variation as a result of multiple consistencies within the demographic 
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